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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-1237 
 ___________ 
 
HAIR RODRIGUEZ MOLINERO, 
          Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A075-614-869) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Walter A. Durling 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 1, 2013 
 
 Before:  AMBRO, JORDAN and BARRY, Circuit Judges  
 
 (Opinion filed: April 5, 2013) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Hair Rodriguez Molinero petitions for review of his final order of removal.  We 
will grant the petition, vacate the order, and remand for the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”) to remand to the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) for a new hearing. 
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I. 
 Molinero is a citizen of Mexico who became a lawful permanent resident of the 
United States in 2001.  He was later convicted of conspiracy to possess with the intent to 
distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 
(b)(1)(A), 846.  The Government charged him as removable for having been convicted of 
an aggravated felony.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  Molinero, proceeding pro se, 
conceded the charge but expressed a fear of returning to Mexico on the ground that the 
Zeta drug cartel would torture and kill or conscript him because he owed it money for 
drugs.  Molinero’s conviction and sentence left him with deferral of removal under the 
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) as the only available form of relief.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) & (b)(2)(B)(i), 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) & (iv).   
 More than six months before Molinero’s first appearance before the IJ, we decided 
Leslie v. Attorney General, 611 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 2010).  In that case, we held that it was 
reversible error per se, without any required showing of prejudice, for an IJ to fail to 
inform a pro se alien of the availability of pro bono counsel and to confirm that the alien 
received the “Legal Services List” of such counsel as required by 8 C.F.R. § 
1240.10(a)(2) and (3).  See Leslie, 611 F.3d at 182.  Because the IJ failed to do so in that 
case, we vacated the order of removal and remanded for a new hearing.  See id. at 183. 
 Molinero appeared pro se before the IJ who presided over Leslie.  As did the 
petitioner in Leslie, Molinero informed the IJ that he was seeking a lawyer but could not 
afford one.  Despite Leslie, however, there is no record of the IJ having notified Molinero 
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of the availability of pro bono counsel or having confirmed that he received the pro bono 
list.  The IJ granted Molinero two continuances to retain paid counsel but ultimately 
required him to proceed pro se after he was unable to do so.  Molinero, incarcerated and 
without counsel, did not present any evidence in support of his CAT claim.  The IJ denied 
it and ordered his removal to Mexico.  Molinero thereafter retained counsel to file an 
appeal to the BIA.  He argued, inter alia, that the IJ erred in requiring him to proceed 
without counsel.  The BIA disagreed and dismissed his appeal. 
 Molinero petitioned for review pro se.  We stayed his removal, sua sponte 
appointed counsel, and directed the parties to brief “whether Petitioner’s removal order is 
valid under Leslie[.]”  Molinero then filed a motion to summarily grant his petition for 
review on the basis of Leslie.  The Government responded with a motion to dismiss for 
lack of jurisdiction, but it later filed a motion to remand to the BIA.  The parties dispute 
the proper scope of remand, and their motions have been referred to this merits panel.  
Molinero has also requested an award of costs. 
II. 
 The Government concedes that a remand is warranted in this case “in the interest 
of justice,” but it also argues that, to the extent we might disagree with it on the scope of 
remand, we lack jurisdiction over Molinero’s petition.  Because we have an independent 
obligation to examine our jurisdiction, see Shehu v. Att’y Gen., 482 F.3d 652, 655 (3d 
Cir. 2007), we must resolve that issue despite the Government’s consent to a remand. 
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A. Jurisdiction 
 The Government argued in its motion to dismiss that we lack jurisdiction over 
Molinero’s petition because (1) he has been convicted of an aggravated felony, and (2) he 
failed to exhaust the Leslie issue before the BIA.  The first of these arguments is without 
merit as explained in the margin,
1
 and the Government has not pressed it in its brief.  
Only the question of exhaustion requires discussion. 
 Our jurisdiction is limited to issues that the petitioner exhausted before the BIA.  
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Lin v. Att’y Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 119-21 & n.6 (3d Cir. 2008).  
This exhaustion requirement is a “liberal” one that we do not apply “in a draconian 
fashion.”  Lin, 543 F.3d at 121 (quotation marks omitted).  To the contrary, a petitioner 
need only have made “some effort, however insufficient, to place the [BIA] on notice” of 
the issue being raised.  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  Under this standard, a petitioner 
need not have “explicitly argue[d]” an issue before the BIA so long as what he or she did 
put the BIA “on notice that there was a claim of error hovering around” that issue.  Wu v. 
Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 418, 422 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 In this case, the Government contends that Molinero failed to exhaust the Leslie 
                                                 
1
 The Government argued that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) deprives us of jurisdiction 
because Molinero has been convicted of an aggravated felony.  Despite that provision, 
however, we retain jurisdiction to review “constitutional claims or questions of law.”  
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).  In Leslie, we squarely held that whether the IJ’s non-
compliance with the applicable regulations requires a new hearing constitutes a 
reviewable question of law.  See Leslie, 611 F.3d at 175.  We also noted that the 
Government’s argument to the contrary was “manifestly incorrect.”  Id. at 174 n.2.  In 
light of Leslie, the Government’s initial reliance on this argument is inexplicable.  
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issue because he argued before the BIA only that the IJ erred in denying him a further 
continuance to retain counsel and did not cite the actual regulations applicable to his 
Leslie claim.  We reject that argument.  Molinero’s brief to the BIA, the relevant portion 
of which is set forth in the margin,
2
 specifically argued that the IJ erred in requiring him 
to proceed without counsel and even mentioned the pro bono list.  “While the 
Government is technically correct that [Molinero] did not explicitly argue” the Leslie 
                                                 
2 Molinero argued: 
 
  The IJ Erred in Conducting the Individual Hearing Without Counsel 
for Appellant 
 
The IJ also erred in going forward with Appellant’s Individual Hearing 
without counsel for Appellant.  The IJ states in his decision that: 
 
[T]he respond[ent], by the way, was given at least two 
opportunities to seek an attorney at his own expense.  The 
Court explained to him that the pro bono list the Court 
maintains is not effective for anyone still serving a term of 
imprisonment.  Nonetheless, the Court did give him two 
continuances.  He was unable to secure an attorney, so we 
proceeded.   
 
Oral Decision of the Immigration Judge at 2. 
 
The IJ should not have proceeded with the Individual Hearing until such 
time that Appellant had retained counsel.  The IJ should have been aware 
that it is very difficult for an inmate in a federal detention center to make 
calls to the outside, much less call around to shop for counsel. 
 Appellant did not submit any exhibits at his Individual Hearing in 
support of his CAT application.  Had the IJ granted another continuance, 
Appellant would have been able to retain counsel, and counsel would have 
made sure to file exhibits to support Appellant’s claims. . . . 
 
(A.R. 29-30.)   
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issue, these arguments sufficiently put the BIA “on notice that there was a claim of error 
hovering around” the IJ’s handling of the counsel issue.  Wu, 393 F.3d at 422.  That is so 
particularly because Leslie was of fairly recent vintage and involved the same IJ whose 
ruling the BIA reviewed in this case. 
 The Government also argues that we should deem Molinero’s efforts insufficient 
because he was represented by counsel before the BIA.  We reject that argument as well.  
We have never limited the liberality of our exhaustion policy to pro se litigants.  See, e.g., 
Hoxha v. Holder, 559 F.3d 157, 158-61 (3d Cir. 2009) (petitioner represented before the 
BIA); Lin, 543 F.3d at 118, 120-22 (same); Wu, 393 F.3d at 421-22 (not specifying 
whether petitioner was represented).  The Government, relying on Higgs v. Attorney 
General, 655 F.3d 333 (3d Cir. 2011), argues that Molinero’s representation by counsel 
meant that the BIA was not required to construe his arguments liberally.  In Higgs, 
however, we held merely that the BIA should have liberally construed the petitioner’s pro 
se notice of appeal for purposes of determining which ruling he intended to appeal.  See 
id. at 340-41.  We addressed exhaustion in that case, but our ruling that the petitioner had 
exhausted his arguments turned, not on his pro se status, but on the same liberal 
exhaustion policy that we have applied in counseled cases such as this one.  See id. at 338 
(citing Lin, 543 F.3d at 120).  Under that policy, the Leslie issue is exhausted.  We have 
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) to review it, and we do so de novo.  See Leslie, 
611 F.3d at 175. 
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B. The Merits 
 In Leslie, we held that a new hearing was required where the record showed that 
the IJ did not inform the alien of the availability of pro bono counsel or confirm that he 
received a copy of the pro bono list.  See Leslie, 611 F.3d at 173, 182.  Molinero argues 
that the same IJ committed the same error in this case.  Having reviewed the record, we 
agree that there is no meaningful basis to distinguish Leslie for the reasons explained in 
the margin and that the same result is required here.  As in Leslie, Molinero’s Notice to 
Appear stated that a list of pro bono counsel would be provided to him and contained a 
checked box indicating that it had (A.R. 258), but no such list appears of record.  See 
Leslie, 611 F.3d at 173-74.  As in Leslie, Molinero told the IJ that he was trying to obtain 
counsel but was not yet able to afford it (A.R. 89, 92), and Molinero went even further 
and filed a written motion for a continuance on that basis (A.R. 240).  See Leslie, 611 
F.3d at 174.  Also as in Leslie, there is no record of the IJ having explained the 
availability of pro bono counsel or having confirmed that Molinero received the pro bono 
list at any of his hearings on January 25, March 3, June 21, August 23 or September 26, 
2011.  See Leslie, 611 F.3d at 174. 
 The Government does not argue that the IJ actually fulfilled his obligations under 
Leslie in this case.  Instead, it argues that the record is “unclear” on that point.  It further 
argues that (its position on exhaustion aside) we should remand only for the BIA to 
address the Leslie issue in the first instance and not for a new hearing because the BIA 
should generally have the first word in areas falling within its special expertise.  See INS 
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v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002).  We reject these arguments.   
 In the first place, there is nothing “unclear” about whether the IJ complied with his 
obligation under Leslie.  In arguing otherwise, the Government relies on the IJ’s 
statement in his oral decision that “[t]he Court explained to [Molinero] that the pro bono 
list the Court maintains is not effective for anyone still serving a sentence of 
imprisonment.”  (IJ Dec. at 2; A.R. 54.)  As Molinero points out, the record reflects no 
such explanation.  And even if it did, that explanation provides no indication that the IJ 
actually informed Molinero of the availability of pro bono counsel or confirmed that he 
received the pro bono list.  To the contrary, the IJ’s purported explanation arguably 
makes this case even worse than Leslie because, if the IJ told Molinero that the pro bono 
list is “not effective” in light of his incarceration, then the IJ effectively told him that 
counsel was not available.
3
 
 Nor is this a matter over which the BIA has any special expertise or is in any 
better position to decide.  This issue comes to us on a written administrative record, just 
as it came to the BIA and just as it did in Leslie.  In Leslie itself, we decided whether the 
IJ had erred and the effect of that error without remanding for the BIA to do so in the first 
instance, and we specified that we were “remand[ing] for a new hearing.”  Leslie, 611 
F.3d at 173.  The Government has raised no persuasive reason why the result in this case 
                                                 
3
 Molinero’s incarceration provides no basis to distinguish Leslie because Leslie was 
serving a criminal sentence, see Leslie, 611 F.3d at 173-74, and the applicable regulation 
makes no exception for incarcerated aliens.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(2), (3). 
 
9 
 
should be different, and it should not.
4
 
 The only remaining issue on the merits is the Government’s assertion that 
Molinero has waived his CAT claim by not challenging the denial of that claim on 
review.  We reject that argument as well, and we fail to understand its significance.  
Molinero argues that he is entitled to a new hearing before the IJ, which necessarily 
includes a hearing on his CAT claim, and we agree.  Our remand for a new hearing thus 
necessarily includes a remand for further proceedings on that claim. 
C. Costs 
 Finally, we address the issue of costs.  In his response to the Government’s motion 
for a limited remand, Molinero requests that we tax costs against the Government under 
the Equal Access to Justice Act, which authorizes an award of the costs enumerated in 28 
U.S.C. § 1920 to the prevailing party in actions brought by or against the United States.  
See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(a)(1).  Molinero’s counsel specified that he does not seek to profit 
from this pro bono engagement by requesting attorney’s fees and instead seeks 
reimbursement only of copying expenses and the like normally taxable as costs.  The 
Government has not opposed Molinero’s request, and we agree that costs are taxable 
against it.  See Fed. R. App. P. 39(b).
5
   
                                                 
4
 We note that, in the only case of which we are aware in which the BIA has addressed a 
Leslie error, the BIA recognized that the error requires a new hearing and remanded for 
that purpose.  See In re Clarke, No. A046-242-569, 2012 WL 6641683 (BIA Oct. 31, 
2012) (unpublished). 
 
5
 Because Molinero has requested only costs and not “fees and other expenses,” we need 
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 An award of costs is warranted in this case because the Government’s conduct has 
required the needless expenditure of resources by Molinero’s pro bono counsel, who 
accepted this engagement as a service to the Court.  The Government responded to 
Molinero’s motion for summary action on the basis of Leslie by filing a motion to 
dismiss based in part on an argument that we rejected as “manifestly incorrect” in Leslie 
itself.  611 F.3d at 174 n.2.  In our order referring those motions to the merits panel, we 
noted that the Government’s position in this case appeared inconsistent with its position 
in two other cases in which we appointed counsel to brief the Leslie issue and in which 
the Government then promptly consented to a full remand.  When Molinero’s counsel 
sought the Government’s agreement to do the same in this case, the Government 
informed him that it would instead proceed to briefing.  Only after Molinero filed his 
brief did the Government file a motion to remand, and even then the Government 
continued to resist the remand for a new hearing that Leslie clearly requires.  Under these 
circumstances, taxation of costs for Molinero is appropriate. 
                                                                                                                                                             
not decide whether the Government’s position in this case “was substantially justified” or 
whether “special circumstances make an award unjust.”  28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); see 
also Cruz v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 630 F.3d 321, 324-25 (3d Cir. 2010).  Instead, we 
exercise our discretion to award costs to the prevailing party.  Molinero is a “prevailing 
party” despite the Government’s consent to a limited remand because he has prevailed 
both on his petition for review and on his argument regarding the proper scope of 
remand, and thus has obtained what he sought over the Government’s opposition.  See 
Johnson v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 205, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that petitioner who 
obtains a remand to the BIA is a “prevailing party” under 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A)). 
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III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the BIA’s order of removal and remand 
for the BIA to remand for the IJ to hold a new hearing after complying with his 
obligations under 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(2) and (3).  We will also tax costs against the 
Government.  Molinero’s motion for leave to file a sur-reply to the Government’s motion 
to remand is granted.  The parties’ other motions are denied.6 
                                                 
6
 We note our formal appreciation for the services of Molinero’s appointed counsel.  
